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NOTES AND COMMENTS
complicity in one is extremely weak evidence of identity with the other.
The principal case, then, is apparently unsupported by the cases cited
by the court, and seems definitely out of line with prior decisions involv-
ing the use of testimony as to other offenses to prove identity.
JOSEPH M. KITTNER.
Declaratory Judgments-Insurance.
Plaintiff, insurer, issued life policies to defendant, the insured, pro-
viding for waiver of premiums and payment of benefits in the event of
the insured's becoming disabled. Having refused to allow repeated
claims for disability benefits, the insurer sought declaratory relief in a
federal court to the effect that the insured was not disabled and that
the policies were void for non-payment of premiums. Held, by the
Supreme Court, the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act1 is constitu-
tional, and a controversy was presented in which the insurer was en-
titled to declaratory relief.
2
In spite of three adverse Supreme Court dicta,3 it has been assumed
generally that the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act, if invoked in an
actual controversy, 4 is valid. This assumption has found support in
numerous decisions of state courts sustaining, similar legislation, 5 in the
Supreme Court's apparent change of attitude in Nashville, Chattanooga,
and St. Louis Ry. v. Wallace,6 and in favorable decisions in the lower
federal courts.7 The principal case is, however, the first square hold-
ing by the Supreme Court that the Federal Act is constitutional. The
decision is equally significant as an indication of the increasing utility
of the declaratory judgment in insurance cases.8
148 STAT. 955 (1934) as amended 49 STAT. 1027 (1935), 28 U. S. C. A. §400
(Supp. 1936). Compare with North Carolina Declaratory Judgment Act, N. C.
CODE ANN. (Michie, 1935) §628.
'Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U. S. 227, 57 Sup. Ct. 461, 81 L. ed.
Adv. Ops. 394 (1937).
'Liberty Warehouse Co. v. Grannis, 273 U. S. 70, 47 Sup. Ct. 282, 71 L. ed.
541 (1927); Liberty Warehouse Co. v. Burley Tobacco Growers' Co6perative
Marketing Ass'n, 276 U. S. 71, 88, 48 Sup. Ct. 291, 294, 72 L. ed. 473, 479 (1928) ;
Willing v. Chicago Auditorium Ass'n, 277 U. S. 274, 289, 48 Sup. Ct. 507, 509,
72 L. ed. 880, 884 (1928). Cases criticized, Borchard, The Supreme Court and
the Declaratory Judgment (1928) 14 A. B. A. J. 633, 635.
' U. S. CoNsT. Art. III, §2; Muskrat v. United States, 219 U. S. 346, 31 Sup.
Ct. 250, 55 L. ed. 246 (1911). The Federal Act, cited supra note 1, limits the
power to grant declaratory judgments to "cases of actual controversy."
'State v. Grove, 109 Kan. 619, 201 Pac. 82 (1921); Board of Education v.
Van Zandt, 119 Misc. 124, 195 N. Y. Supp. 297 (1922) ; Carolina Power and Light
Co. v. Iseley, 203 N. C. 811, 167 S. E. 56 (1933); Petition of Kariher, 284 Pa.
455, 131 Atl. 265 (1925).
8288 U. S. 249, 264, 53 Sup. Ct. 345, 348, 77 L. ed. 730, 736 (1933) (declaratory
judgment under Tennessee Statute held to be entitled to review in the Supreme
Court).I
'Commercal Casualty Co. v. Plummer, 13 F. Supp. 169 (S. D. Tex. 1935);
Gully v. Interstate Natural Gas Co., 82 F. (2d) 145 (C. C. A. 5th, 1936).
8 For a more extended treatment of the declaratory judgment and the insurance
contract see: Morrison, Availability of the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act for
Life Insurance Cases (1937) 23 A. B. A. J. 788; comment (1936) 46 YALE L. J.
286.
THE NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
An insurance policy may be invalid because of fraud or misrepre-
sentation in its procurement, or it may lapse for breach of conditions or
non-payment of premiums. Whatever the cause of the policy's becom-
ing inoperative, where there is a dispute between insurer and insured
as to its validity, it is to the advantage of the insurer to secure a final
adjudication of the dispute as soon as possible. The insurer may notify
the insured of the rescission of the policy, but if the insured denies the
insurer's right to rescind and there is any doubt about the matter, the
insurer is forced to maintain reserves to cover the policy until its action
has been upheld by the courts. In the principal case the policies would
continue in force under the waiver clause, in spite of failure to pay the
premiums, if the insured were actually disabled. But the insured de-
layed bringing suit for disability benefits, and the question- of his dis-
ability remained undetermined. Although the Statute of Limitations
would begin to run against the insured as to the disability benefits, it
would not operate against the beneficiary until the latter's cause of
action should accrue upon the death of the insured. The insured might
not die until twenty or thirty years later, and at his death the beneficiary
might bring an action on the policy, prove that the insured was disabled,
that payment of premiums was unnecessary, and thus recover from the
insurer. Throughout those years the insurer would have to set aside
reserves to cover the policy and, unless permitted to take the initiative
in bringing the controversy 'before the courts, would have to await
passively an action by the other parties. Meanwhile many of its im-
portant witnesses might die or disappear and the memory of those re-
maining would be dimmed by the passage of time,9 with the result that
its defenses would become materially weakened.' 0
Before the enactment of declaratory judgment statutes the remedy
of the insurer was the bill in equity for cancellation. But equitable
relief was available only when the remedy at law was inadequate." In
order to show this inadequacy it was not sufficient to prove fraud or
misrepresentation in procurement of the policy' 2 or that the insured
'The insurer might be protected to some extent by a bill to perpetuate testi-
mony or its equivalent under the codes. N. C. CODE ANx. (Michie, 1938)
§1822(1)-(4); McINToSH, NORTH CAROLINA PRACTcE AND PROCEDURE (1929)
§985; WALSH, EQuirk (1930) §116.
" An even more serious dilemma is presented by the disputed policy when it
has been issued by a mutual company, in which the policy-holder is entitled to a
voice in the management and a share in *the profits. Until disputes of this kind
are adjudicated there is a problem as to which policy-holders are entitled to vote
in elections and share in the surplus of the company.
n Note (1935) 97 A. L. R. 572.
2 Phoenix Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Bailey, 13 Wallace 616, 20 L. ed. 501 (1871)
Cable v. United States Life Ins. Co., 191 U. S. 288, 24 Sup. Ct. 74, 48 L. ed. 188
(1903); Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Smith, 73 Fed. 318 (C. C. E. D. N. C. 1896);
N. Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Miller, 73 F. (2d) 350 (C. C. A. 8th, 1934); Globe Mutual
Life Ins. Co. v. Reals, 79 N. Y. 202 (1879). Contra: John Hancock Mutual Life
Ins. Co. v. Dick, 114 Mich. 337, 72 N. W. 179 (1897). Cancellation has also been
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had defaulted in payment of premiums.' 3 It was necessary, in addition,
to prove special circumstances under which the insurer would suffer
not merely inconvenience but irreparable injury if left to its defenses.'
4
Such circumstances could be proved by showing that the policy con-
tained an incontestable clause,15 for unless the insurer were allowed to
sue in equity before the expiration of the contestable period he would
be in danger of losing forever his right to contest upon grounds covered
by the clause. The incontestable clause does not apply where the policy
is contested for non-payment of premiums or breach of condition sub-
sequent, and in such cases the presence of the clause in the policy does
not make the remedy at law inadequate.
Insurance companies have sought to obtain through the declaratory
judgment a more complete remedy than that afforded by the bill to can-
cel. The declaratory judgment provides a speedy and effective method
of determining whether insurance policies are valid and operative by
allowing the insurer to take the initiative in obtaining an adjudication
of the issues. Policy-holders and beneficiaries have no legitimate com-
plaint against its use since the right of jury trial upon questions of fact
is specifically provided.' 6 The public, as well as the insurer, has a vital
interest in the efficient management of insurance companies, and both
should benefit by the elimination of uncertainty and delay. In deciding
upon the applicability of the declaratory judgment to suits by the in-
surer to determine its liability upon a policy, courts have been faced
with three problems: (1) whether such a suit presents an actual con-
troversy, (2) whether a declaration of immunity from liability is a
declaration of "rights and other legal relations,"' 7 and (3) whether the
availability of another remedy precludes declaratory relief.
refused on the grounds of an adequate remedy at law in Griesa v. Mutual Life
Ins. Co., 169 Fed. 509 (C. C. A. 8th, 1909) (where insured committed suicide)
and in Imperial Fire Ins. Co. v. Gunning, 81 Il. 236 (1876) (where policy-holder
set fire to insured property).
'Bank Savings Life Ins. Co. v. Wood, 122 Kan. 831, 253 Pac. 431 (1927);
Globe Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Reals, 79 N. Y. 202 (1879).
'"The danger of loss of testimony is not sufficient to make the remedy at law
inadequate. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Smith, 73 Fed. 318 (C. C. E. D. N. C.
1896); Nat. Life and Accident Ins. Co. v. Propst, 219 Ala. 437, 122 So. 656
(1929) ; Town of Venice v. Woodruff, 62 N. Y. 462 (1875) (action by municipal-
ity to cancel bonds) ; Globe Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Reals, 79 N. Y. 202 (1879).
Contra: Conn. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Home Ins. Co., 6 Fed. Cas. No. 3,107
(C. C. D. Conn. 1879).
N. Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Siymour, 45 F. (2d) 47 (C. C. A. 6th, 1930) ; N. Y.
Life Ins. Co. v. Rigas, 117 Conn. 437, 168 Atl. 22 (1933) ; Travelers' Ins. Co. v.
Snydecker, 127 Misc. 66, 215 N. Y. Supp. 277 (1926) ; see Am. Trust Co. v. Life
Ins. Co. of Va., 173 N. C. 558, 567, 92 S. E. 706, 711; note (1931) 73 A. L. R.
1529.
"48 STAT. 955 (1934) as amended 49 STAT. 1027 (1935), 28 U. S. C. A. §400
(3) (Supp. 1936).
2748 STAT. 955 (1934) as amended 49 STAT. 1027 (1935), 28 U. S. C. A. §400
(1) (Supp. 1936).
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The principal case decides that in such suits an actual controversy
exists and that a declaration of non-liability is a declaration of "rights
and other legal relations." The third problem has caused the greatest
confusion among the state and lower federal courts. A number of
courts have applied equity rules to petitions for declaratory judgments,
refusing relief where there is a so-called adequate remedy at law,1 8
and requiring the insurer to wait and defend a future suit. Other
courts, taking a more practical view of the situation, have refused to
apply such a restriction. 9 The provision in the statute for declarations
"whether or not further relief is or could be prayed" 20 and the result
in the principal case, although the issue was not raised, would seem to
indicate that the existence of another remedy is no absolute bar.
Although the availability of another remedy should not, as a matter
of law, automatically bar a declaratory judgment, the fact of its ex-
istence may be properly considered by the court in determining whether,
in the exercise of its sound discretion, it should refuse declaratory re-
lief. In Aetna Casualty and Surety Co. v. Quarles,21 the insurer asked
for a declaration that it was not liable to a judgment creditor of the
insured, holder of an automobile liability policy. A suit by the judg-
ment creditor against the insurer, as provided in the policy, was already
pending.- The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals held a refusal to grant
a declaratory judgment under the circumstances to be a proper exercise
of judicial discretion.
The extent of the courts' discretion to refuse relief under the Fed-
' Western Casualty and Surety Co. v. Beverforden, 17 F. Supp. 928 (W. D.
Mo. 1936); Columbia Nat. Life Ins. Co. v. Foulke, 13 F. Supp. 350 (W. D. Mo.
1936), rezd, 89 F. (2d) 261 (C. C. A. 8th, 1937); Associated Indemnity Corp. v.
Manning, 16 F. Supp. 430 (W. D. Wash. 1936) semble; Brindley v. Meara, 198 N. E.
301 (Ind. 1935) (dispute between advisory board and trustee of township) ; Mer-
chants' Mutual Casualty Co. v. Leone, 9 N. E. (2d) 553 (Mass. 1937) ; Wolverine
Mutual Motor, Ins. Co. v. Clark, 277 Mich. 633, 270 N. W. 167 (1936); Stewart
v. Herten, 125 Neb. 210, 249 N. W. 552 (1933) (involving appointment of guard-
ian); Reynolds v. Chase, 177 Atl. 291 (N. H. 1935) (involving construction and
validity of contract); see Babcock v. Babcock, 147 Misc. 900, 903, 265 N. Y.
Supp. 470, 474 (1933) (alimony suit).
Equitable Life Assurance Soc. v. Templeton, 19. F. Supp. 485 (E. D. S. C.
1936); Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Williams, 88 F. (2d) 929 (C. C. A. 8th, 1937);
Columbia Nat. Life Ins. Co. v. Foulke, 89 F. (2d) 261 (C. C. A. 8th, 1937);
Anderson v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 89 F. (2d) 345 (C. C. A. 4th, 1937) ; Stephenson
v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc. (C. C. A. 4th, Sept. 29, 1937) (suit by insured
against insurer). Declaratory judgments have been held proper, without discus-
sion of the effect of the availability of other remedies, in the following suits
by the insurer where the remedy at law would be considered adequate: Ohio
Casualty Co. v. Plummer, 13 F. Supp. 169" (S. D. Tex. 1935) ; Commercial Cas-
ualty Co. v. Humphrey, 13 F. Supp. 174 (S. D. Tex. 1935); Travelers' Ins. Co.
v. Helmer, 15 F. Supp. 355 (N. D. Ga. 1936); Travelers' Ins. Co. v. Young, 18
F. Supp. 450 (D. N. J. 1937); American Motorists' Ins. Co. v. Central Garage,
86 N. H. 362, 169 Ati. 121 (1933); Glens Falls Indemnity Co. v. Keliher, 187
Atl. 473 (N. H. 1936). See BORCHARD, DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS (1934) 149.
1'48 STAT. 955 (1934) as amended 49 STAT. 1027 (1935), 2S U. S. C. A. §400
(1) (Supp. 1936).
C. C. A. 4th, Sept. 29, 1937.
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eral Declaratory Judgment Act is not dear. Whatever discretion exists
is a judicial discretion subject to appellate review.22 The Uniform
Declaratory Judgment Act, which has been adopted in North Carolina,
makes refusal of declaratory relief discretionary where the uncertainty
or the controversy giving rise to the proceeding would not be ter-
minated.2s There is no such provision in the Federal Act, and it has
been strongly contended that the federal courts have no power to refuse
to entertain jurisdiction in the exercise of a discretion not based upon
an established rule of law. 24 In the Quarles case the court takes the
position that it is implied that the granting of declaratory judgments
shall rest in the court's discretion, since the statute merely gives the
court power to grant the remedy without prescribing conditions under
which it is to be granted. The possibility that the useful purpose of
declaratory judgment statutes may be defeated by an abuse of judicial
discretion is a danger that should be carefully guarded against. In the
Quarles case, however, the granting of a declaratory judgment after an
action had been brought against the insurer was unnecessary, and the
decision is to be commended as an intelligent exercise of the court's
discretion under the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act.
MOSEs BRAXTON GILLAM, JR.
Equity-Extent of Injunction Against Nuisances.
Plaintiffs petitioned to enjoin as a nuisance a roadhouse situated in
plaintiffs' neighborhood. A dancing pavillion was operated in connec-
tion with the roadhouse where music was continuously played, and
where patrons remained throughout the night cursing, gambling, drink-
ing, and fighting. Notwithstanding the fact that some of the acts con-
nected with the operation of the business were legitimate, the decree
granted by the court enjoined the operation of the business in its en-
tirety.1
As shown by the principal case, a lawful business may become a
nuisance by reason of the manner of its operation. 2 In framing a decree
to enjoin such nuisances most courts in the absence of a statute hold that
there cannot be abatement to the extent of closing out the whole busi-
BORCHARD, DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS (1934) 100.
2 UNIFORM DECLARATORY JUDGMENT ACT §6, 9 UNIFORM LAWS ANN. 127;
N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1935) §628(e).
" Morrison, Availability of the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act for Life
Insurance Cases (1937) 23 A. B. A. J. 788, 791.
1Hunnicutt v. Eaton, 191 S. E. 919 (Ga. 1937).
'Nevins v. McGavock, 214 Ala. 93, 106 So. 597 (1925) ; Junction City Lumber
Co. v. Sharp, 92 Ark. 538, 123 S. W. 370 (1909); Sullivan v. Royster, 72 Cal.
248, 13 Pac. 655 (1887) ; Gilbert v. Davidson Constr. Co., 110 Kan. 298, 203 Pac.
1113 (1922) ; Block v. Fertitta, 165 S. W. 504 (Tex. 1914) ; LEwIs AND SPELLING,
INJUNcTIONs (1926) §288.
